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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. D. SHELLEDY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
EDWARD LORE, ALAN PARSONS, 
ERIN PARSONS, ROY HOCKIN, 
HARRY DECKERED, KENT C. 
BANGERTER, LLOYD V. McBRIDE, 
DAVID C. KUNZ, SUSAN S. KUNZ, 
individual, MERIT DISTRIBUTING 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT E. D. SHELLEDY 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this matter is before the Supreme Court 
based on Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated. The parties believe that the 
trial court's ruling resolved all issues before it, but, 
alternatively, the trial court certified the ruling for appeal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review arise out of the question of 
the validity of a purported 1984 final May tax sale of the 
property, and the subsequent taxation and ownership of the 
property. 
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The trial court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
All issues are purely legal conclusions. The standard of review 
on each is, therefore, a review for correctness, with no 
deference accorded the trial court's decision, and all facts and 
inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to 
appellant. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 
1989). See, Argument Point I. 
More specifically, the issues are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court err in upholding the 1984 tax sale 
by Salt Lake County in the face of Shellesdy's claim that it was 
void for lack of jurisdiction because of the immunity of the 
federal government's agency, the Small Business Administration 
(hereinafter SBA). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that Shelledy's claim 
against the 1984 tax sale was barred by the special statutes of 
limitations? 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that Shelledy lacked 
standing to dispute the validity of the 1984 tax sale? 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION MAY BE DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections: 
78-12-5.1 Seizure or possession within seven 
years — Proviso — Tax title. 
No action for the recovery of real property 
or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless the plaintiff or his 
predecessor was seized or possessed of such 
property within seven years from the 
commencement of such action; provided, 
however, that with respect to actions or 
defenses brought or interposed for the 
recovery or possession of or to quiet title 
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or determine the ownership of real property 
against the holder of a tax title to such 
property, no such action or defense shall be 
commenced or interposed more than four years 
after the date of the tax deed, conveyance, 
or transfer creating such tax title unless 
the person commencing or interposing such 
action or defense or his predecessor has 
actually occupied or been in possession of 
such property within four years prior to the 
commencement or interposition of such action 
or defense or within one year from the 
effective date of this amendment. 
78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title-
Limitations of action or defense — Proviso. 
No action or defense for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title 
or determine the ownership thereof shall be 
commenced or interposed against the holder of 
a tax title after the expiration of four 
years from the date of the sale, conveyance 
or transfer of such tax title to any county, 
or directly to any other purchaser thereof at 
any public or private tax sale and after the 
expiration of one year from the date of this 
act. Provided, however, that this section 
shall not bar any action or defense by the 
owner of the legal title to such property 
where he or his predecessor has actually 
occupied or been in actual possession of such 
property within four years from the 
commencement or interposition of such action 
or defense. And provided further, that this 
section shall not bar any defense by a city 
or town, to an action by the holder of a tax 
title, to the effect that such city or town 
holds a lien against such property which is 
equal or superior to the claim of the holder 
of such tax title. 
78-12-5.3. Definitions of "tax title" and 
"action." 
(1) The term "tax title" as used in §78-12-
5.1 and §59-2-1364, and the related amended 
§§ 78-12-5, 78-12-7, and 78-12-12, means any 
title to real property, whether valid or not, 
which has been derived through or is 
dependent upon any sale, conveyance, or 
transfer of property in the course of a 
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statutory proceeding for the liquidation of 
any tax levied against the property whereby 
the property is relieved from a tax lien. 
(2) The word "action" as used in these 
sections includes counterclaims and cross-
complaints and all civil actions wherein 
affirmative relief is sought. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff, E. D. Shelledy, filed a complaint to quiet 
title in Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County against 
various defendants who claimed or might otherwise claim an 
interest in the real estate in dispute, and against Salt Lake 
County for recovery of taxes on the property which Shelledy paid 
under protest. R. 2-22. 
Shelledy filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the 
1984 tax sale was void because of the sovereign immunity of the 
United States and its agencies and instrumentalities, and that no 
taxes could accrue while the SBA held record title to the 
property and, therefore, Shelledy was entitled quiet title and to 
a refund of tax monies paid under protest. R. 69-84, 101-114. 
Salt Lake County responded and moved for summary judgment, 
claiming either that the 1984 tax sale was valid, or any 
challenge to the tax sale was barred by limitations statutes, 
and/or that Shelledy lacked standing to challenge the validity of 
the 1984 tax sale. R. 85-98, 119-127. 
The trial court denied Shelledy's motion and granted that of 
Salt Lake County for the reasons argued in Salt Lake County's 
memoranda. R. 130. Final judgment was entered on the court's 
ruling on January 17, 1990, and the trial court alternatively 
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certified it for appeal under Rule 54(b). R. 131-132. Shelledy 
filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's decision on 
February 9, 1990, seeking reversal of the trial court's decision 
and a remand ordering the trial court to enter judgment in favor 
of Shelledy. R. 136-137. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The real property which is the subject of the dispute herein 
is described as: 
Beginning at a point which is north 660 ft. 
from the southwest corner of the northwest 
quarter of Sec. 29, Township 3 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence north 220 ft.; thence west 990 
ft.; then south 220 ft.; thence east 990 ft. 
to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a 49.5 ft. right of way for Utah 
Lake Irrigation Co. canal and to a right of 
way over the east portion for 1000 East 
Street, 
and is situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. R. 72. 
Immediately prior to January 14, 1981, record title to the 
property was held by Clair R. and Virginia S. Pearson. Salt Lake 
County claimed a lien on the property for prior unpaid ad valorem 
taxes and the SBA held a mortgage on the property. R. 72, R. 78. 
On January 14, 1981, the SBA acquired record title to the 
property by quit-claim deed from the Pearsons which was recorded 
in Book 5246, page 836, as entry number 3563244. R. 72, R. 78. 
On May 23, 1984, Salt Lake County purported to convey the 
property to Edward Lore by tax deed at a final May tax sale. 
R. 72, R. 79. Edward Lore then conveyed his interest, if any, to 
the property to various other defendants as follows: 
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On or about May 23, 1984, defendant Edward Lore 
conveyed by Quit Claim Deed an undivided 8/9's of his 
interest, if any, to defendants Alan Parsons, Erin 
Parsons, Harry Deckered, Kent C. Bangerter, Roy Hockin, 
and Merit Distributing, Inc., and to non-defendants 
William Conover and Fiduciary Financial Services Inc. 
William Conover, on or about July 10, 1984, conveyed 
his interest, if any, to defendant David C. Kunz. 
Fiduciary Financial Services conveyesd its interest, if 
any, on or about March 21, 1985, to defendant Lloyd V. 
McBride. Defendant Edward Lore, on or about June 28, 
1984, conveyed his remaining interest, if any, to 
defendant Merit Distributing, Inc. by Quit Claim Deed. 
R. 72-73; R.80, 81, 82, 83. 
On or about December 28, 1988, the SBA conveyed its interest 
in the property to plaintiff Shelledy by quit-claim deed, under 
which Shelledy claims fee ownership of the property. R. 73, 
R. 84. 
On or about May 22, 1989, Shelledy paid under protest 
$6,007.39 to the Salt Lake County Treasurer for taxes claimed by 
Salt Lake County to have accrued on the property but which 
Shelledy disputes because of the tax immunity of the federal 
government while the property was owned by the SBA. R. 73. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Shelledy asserts that once the SBA obtained title to the 
property in January, 1981, Salt Lake County was without 
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jurisdiction to either foreclose its tax lien or assess further 
taxes against the property because of the sovereign immunity of 
the United States and its agencies and instrumentalities such as 
the SBA. The tax sale and deed of May, 1984, were therefore void 
and transferred nothing to those claiming thereunder. 
Further, Shelledy asserts that the statutes of limitations 
do not apply in the instant action to bar his claim, or, 
alternatively, if the statutes do apply, they could not run while 
title was held by the SBA, 
Finally, Shelledy claims that he is not asserting the 
constitutional rights of another and that he has standing to 
dispute the validity of the 1984 tax sale and deed, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The instant action comes before the court upon the trial 
court's ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial 
court granted defendant Salt Lake County's motion and denied that 
of the plaintiff, E. D. Shelledy. Shelledy believes the trial 
court erred on both counts. 
Upon review of a motion for summary judgment, the Supreme 
Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court, Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977), that is, 
the party against who judgment is granted is entitled to have all 
the facts presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom, 
considered in a light most favorable to him. Geneva Pipe Co. v. 
S & H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). Only when there exists 
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no genuine dispute as to any material facts and a party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law should the trial court 
grant summary judgment• Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Since the appeal 
presents a review only of legal conclusions, the Court is free to 
reappraise the trial court's conclusions for correctness without 
according any deference to the conclusions of the trial court. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
As the trial court apparently accepted all the arguments of 
Salt Lake County, Shelledy will address each issue raised in the 
trial court and on which he believes the trial court erred in 
ruling in favor of Salt Lake County and against him. 
POINT II: THE FINAL MAY TAX SALE 
WAS VOID BECAUSE THE COUNTY LACKED 
JURISDICTION TO FORECLOSE ITS LIEN 
The SBA is an agency of the federal government, having been 
established by act of Congress now codified at 15 U.S.C. §633, 
and placed under the general direction and supervision of the 
President of the United States. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has referred to the SBA as a "non-incorporated federal 
agency, ...an integral part of the United States government... .M 
United States v. Mel's Locker, Inc., 346 F.2d 168, 169 (10th Cir. 
1965). The court also reiterated that the SBA "has the full 
sovereign immunity of the United States, unless such immunity has 
been waived by congressional action." Id. at 169. 
A proceeding against property in which the United States has 
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an interest is a suit against the United States. Minnesota v. 
United States, 305 U.S. 382, 595 S.Ct. 292, 83 L.Ed. 235 (1939). 
On or about January 14, 1981, the SBA became record title 
owners of the property in dispute by way of Quit Claim Deed from 
the prior record title owners, Clair R. and Virginia S. Pearson. 
At the time of the conveyance, Salt Lake County held a tax lien 
against the property for unpaid ad valorem taxes having accrued 
prior to the time of the conveyance to the SBA. 
Once the SBA acquired ownership interest under the 1981 
deed, the sovereign immunity of the federal government, and thus 
the SBA, barred the enforcement of the tax lien by Salt Lake 
County, and its attempt to enforce the lien through the final 
May, 1984, tax sale was void. United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 
274, 61 S.Ct. 1011, 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1940); United States v. Pierce 
County, 193 F.529 (D.C. Cir. 1912). Although the U. S. Supreme 
Court in United States v. Alabama, supra, upheld the validity of 
the tax lien itself, the Court left no doubt as to the immunity 
of the government with respect to the county's efforts to enforce 
its lien through a tax sale: 
With respect to the tax sales the case has a 
different aspect. The proceedings in the 
county court for the sales of the lands were 
taken and the decrees were rendered after the 
United States had become the owner of the 
tracts. A proceeding against property in 
which the United States has an interest is a 
suit against the United States. [Citation 
omitted.] The United States was an 
indispensable party to proceedings for the 
sale of the lands, and in the absence of its 
consent to the prosecution of such 
proceedings, the county court was without 
jurisdiction and its decrees, the tax sales 
and the certificates of purchase issued to 
the State were void. 
United States v. Alabama, supra, at U.S. 282. 
The United States v. Alabama decision is completely 
dispositive of the issue of the validity or invalidity of the 
May, 1984, tax sale, as the United States has not given its 
consent to such proceedings which would purport to deprive it or 
its agency, the SBA, of such interests in real property. Thus, 
the tax sale and deed are void, and all the defendants' claims of 
interest in the property, either directly under the tax deed or 
as a derivative claim thereunder, should be declared invalid by 
order of the court quieting title in the plaintiff. 
POINT III: NO TAX COULD BE ASSESSED 
WHILE SBA HELD RECORD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. 
The principle that federally-owned property may not be taxed 
by a state or its political subdivisions unless immunity is 
expressly waived by the federal government goes back over a 
hundred and fifty years. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Utah tax code implicitly recognizes 
this immunity in the exemptions of Section 59-2-1101(2) (a). This 
immunity has been specifically applied to property owned by the 
SBA, United States v. Schwartz, 278 F.Supp. 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968), and has been held to apply to property which was once held 
as mere security for a loan (not immune) but was subsequently 
acquired in fee simple by the SBA. United States v. Roanoke, 
258 F.Supp. 415 (W.D. Va. 1966). 
Thus, Salt Lake County was without authority to assess taxes 
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against the property during the time the SBA was record 
titleholder thereto, from January 14, 1981, to December 28, 1988. 
No lien for taxes during that time may attach to the property and 
plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of all amounts paid under 
protest in May, 1989, for those years, less the amount of the tax 
lien existing on the property as of January 14, 1981. 
POINT IV: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
CANNOT VALIDATE THE VOID DEED, 
Defendant Salt Lake County argues, and the trial court 
apparently accepted, that Shelledy's claim to quiet title to the 
property in question is barred by the special limitations 
statutes of the Utah Code at Sections 78-12-5.1 et seq. The 
defendants' limitations argument and the trial court's reliance 
thereon fails on either of two bases: the limitations statutes 
cannot create title from a deed which was absolutely void for 
lack of jurisdiction, and the limitations time period could not 
commence to run while the title to the property was in the SBA, 
an agency entitled to the full immunity of the United States. 
Under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Alabama, supra, once title to real property is 
acquired by the federal government or, in this case, an agency 
thereof, the states or their political subdivisions lack 
jurisdiction over the property except by express consent of 
Congress, and any proceedings to enforce the lien of Salt Lake 
County, such as the May 1984 tax sale, were void. Id. at 282. 
In such a case where the tax sale is void for lack of 
jurisdiction, good title cannot be created under the void tax 
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deed simply by the passage of time under a statute of 
limitations. 
A void deed is a nullity, having no legal effect. If a deed 
is void, as in this action, as opposed to merely voidable, it is 
invalid in law for any purpose whatsoever, is legally 
insufficient to create a legal title, and affords no protection 
to those claiming under it. 23 AmJur2d Deeds, §188. See also, 
P.Lear, Utah's Short Statutes of Limitations for Tax Titles: The 
Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National Mortgage Bond Corp.—A 
Need for Remedial Legislation, 76 BYU L.Rev. 457, 467 (1976), 
wherein the author notes that where a deed is void, not merely 
voidable, for reasons such as a jurisdictional defect, the 
special or short statutes of limitations favoring tax deeds do 
not run. Similarly, another noted scholar in the area of real 
property law indicates in his treatise that a statute of 
limitations is without application to void deeds. Vol. 5B, 
Thompson, Real Property, §2766 (1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court has tacitly acknowledged that these 
statutes of limitation do not apply in circumstances such as the 
instant case where a deed is void because of lack of 
jurisdiction. In Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P.2d 884 
(1955), the court confirmed that situations involving void deeds 
such as in this action were outside the scope of special statutes 
of limitations: 
It appears obvious that such sections were 
enacted to eliminate the objections pointed 
out in the Toronto case, and were intended to 
prevent raising of defenses based on failure 
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to comply with statutory steps leading down 
the long road traversable in perfecting tax 
titles•.• . 
• • • 
In passing, we do not wish it understood that 
our decision is applicable to conveyances 
void on their face, such as those containing 
no grantor, grantee, description, etc., or to 
those that may be forged or the like, but 
only to those valid on their face, as here, 
and executed by the same authority that could 
have passed good title if each and every 
statutory step in perfecting a tax title had 
been followed, without the aid of a 
limitations statute. 
Id. at 313 and 315. [Emphasis added.] 
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals dealt with a case 
which implicitly recognized that such limitations statutes do not 
apply in situations where a county lacked jurisdiction over the 
property. In Baxter v. Utah Department of Transportation, 783 
P.2d 1045 (Ut.App. 1989), cert, denied 133 U.A.R. 28 (Utah 1990), 
the Court of Appeals was faced with a dispute over title to a 
piece of land on the border of Weber and Davis counties. One 
party relied on a tax deed from 1969 from Davis County. The 
other party claimed that the property was in Weber County and, 
hence, not subject to Davis County's jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals, in its first footnote in Baxter 
recognized these statutes of limitations as exhibiting a desire 
to strengthen these historically much-disputed tax deeds. 
However, after acknowledging these statutory supports for tax 
titles, and in spite of the fact that the case could have easily 
been resolved had these limitations statutes applied, the Court 
of Appeals went on to analyze the case under the assumption that 
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the outcome would be determined by whether the land was under the 
jurisdiction of Weber County or Davis County. 
Thus, in Baxter, the Appeals Court, by implication, found 
that where a county lacks jurisdiction over property, a tax deed 
to that property by such county cannot be validated by a mere 
lapse of time. 
It is clear that these limitations statutes were enacted for 
the purpose of overcoming procedural defects, such as improperly 
executed affidavits or undeputized officers conducting a tax 
sale, which would be voidable during the limitations period. A 
jurisdictional defect such as in the instant case, which renders 
a tax deed void, is beyond the scope of such statutes of 
limitations. 
Alternatively, even assuming, arguendo, that the limitations 
statutes could apply to a void deed, the statutes could not begin 
to run until after the SBA transferred title to the property to 
plaintiff on December 28, 1988. It is firmly established that a 
statute of limitations does not run against the sovereign 
government. 51 AmJur 2d Limitation of Actions, §409. This is 
true with regard to the United States or its officers or agencies 
unless Congress has clearly manifested a contrary intention. Id. 
at §414. 
In Nichols v. Council, 51 Ark 26, 9 SW 305 (1888), it was 
specifically held that a limitations statute could not be put in 
motion while the title to property was still in the United 
States. Similarly, in Oaksmith v. Johnston, 92 U.S. 343, 23 
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L.Ed, 682 (1875), it was held that a statute of limitations 
raises no bar to an action by the government or its grantee in an 
action to recover possession of real property where legal title 
was in the United States. 
Applying this well-established rule to the instant case, if 
the limitations period can run at all in favor of the void deed 
herein, it cannot commence to run until the date the title to the 
property was transferred from the SBA to plaintiff, December, 
1988, and therefore affords no protection to defendants. 
POINT V: SHELLEDY IS ENTITLED 
TO RAISE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY 
OF THE TAX DEED. 
Defendant Salt Lake County raises the defense that plaintiff 
lacks standing to claim the constitutional rights and immunities 
of the federal government. This standing argument is clearly not 
applicable to the factual circumstances of this case. 
It is well-settled that the validity of a tax title or of a 
tax sale can be assailed by one who can show that he or those 
under whom he claims had some title to or interest in the 
property at the time of the sale. Gee v. Bullock, 349 Mo. 1154, 
164 S.W.2d 281 (1942); Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d 
450 (1937); Hopper v. Chandler, 183 Ark. 469, 36 S.W.2d 398 
(1931). Standing to challenge the tax sale or deed is not 
limited to just the original owner at the time of the disputed 
sale, but extends to those who claim under that original owner. 
Preston v. Iron County, 105 Wis.2d 346, 314 N.W.2d 131 (1981); 
Morcom v. Brunner, 30 Wash.App. 532, 635 P.2d 778 (Wash.App. 
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1981) . Each successor is in privity with his predecessor in 
title. Id. 
In the case of Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 (Fla. 
1950), the Florida Supreme Court addressed a situation similar to 
the instant action, where the State purported to grant a tax 
title to land owned by the United States. In arriving at its 
decision, the Florida Court stated: 
The tax deeds here under consideration 
recited that there were taxes due upon the 
property for three years and that the State 
granted title to appellants' predecessors. 
Concededly, the tax deeds were invalid, since 
the United States owned the lands. The 
United States, or any purchaser from the 
United States other than the State of Florida 
would be entitled to challenge the validity 
of the tax deeds and the correctness of the 
recitals thereof,... . 
Id. at 7 39. [Emphasis added.] 
Likewise, Shelledy is entitled to challenge the tax sale 
and deed in dispute herein because of his position of grantee of 
the SBA. 
The doctrine cited by defendant Salt Lake County, and the 
cases cited in its Memorandum are clearly inapposite to the case 
herein. 
The rule stated by the U.S. Supreme Court and raised by the 
county is a corollary closely related to the "cases and 
controversies" requirement that prohibits the federal Supreme 
Court from issuing advisory opinions on issues which are not 
directly before the Court in an actual controversy between the 
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parties before the court. 
The major federal cases decided by the United States Supreme 
Court and cited by the county in its Memorandum are examples of 
this "cases and controversies" limitation. For instance, in 
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 42 (1961), the appellants argued 
that Maryland's Sunday closing laws violated Constitutional 
guarantees of religious liberty (freedom of religion). The 
Court, however, declined to address such a claim because the 
appellants alleged only economic damage to themselves, noting 
that the record was devoid of indications as to what appellants' 
religious beliefs were. Similarly, in United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17 (1960), the district court had held the civil rights 
act unconstitutional because it might enjoin purely private 
actions even though the case itself involved only official 
actions. The Court reversed, finding itself loath to decide 
issues not actually before the Court. Again, in Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), a case involving a constitutional 
challenge of Oklahoma laws prohibiting political work of certain 
state employees, the Court rejected the petitioners' standing to 
raise constitutional questions of the statutes' application to 
other persons in other situations not before the court. 
In the instant case, plaintiff is not trying to assert the 
constitutional right of another. Plaintiff is merely asserting 
the legal effect of a transaction by the county which was void 
and creates a cloud on his title to the property. Such rights as 
the SBA may have had to clear title were transferred to Shelledy, 
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its grantee, and such privity is the basis for Shelledy's 
entitlement to the relief sought. Chantler v. Wood, 430 P.2d 712 
(Az.App. 1967). To deny the grantee of property from the federal 
government this ability would be, in effect, taking property of 
the federal government without the consent of Congress, since it 
would be unable to alienate property which a grantee could not 
make marketable. Plaintiff has every right to challenge actions 
which impair his claim to title to the property. To deny him 
this right would saddle the federal government with the burden of 
itself quieting title to any parcel of land having a question of 
an unlawful lien claim. Congress has not consented to the 
imposition of such a burden. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant E. D. Shelledy respectfully requests the Court 
reverse the decision of the trial court in its entirety and order 
the trial court to enter judgment quieting title to the property 
in Shelledy and against all defendants, and ordering defendant 
Salt lake County to refund the monies paid to it under protest, 
less the amount of the County's tax lien as of January 14, 1981. 
Shelledy also respectfully requests the Court award him 
costs on appeal and to direct the trial court to award him costs 
in the trial court proceedings. 
DATED June J7_, 1990. 
ERIC P. HARTMAN 
Attorney for Appellant 
E. D. Shelledy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
E. D. SHELLEDY, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. 
EDWARD LORE, ALAN PARSONS, 
ERIN PARSONS, ROY HOCKIN, ] 
HARRY DECKERED, KENT C. 
BANGERTER, LLOYD V. McBRIDE, ] 
DAVID C. KUNZ, SUSAN S. KUN2, : 
individual, MERIT DISTRIBUTING; 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF THE ] 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
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1 O R D 
Civil 
i Judge 
E R 
No. 890901388 PR 
James Sawaya 
Plaintiff E. D. Shelledy's and defendant Salt Lake County's 
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing 
on December 18, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding. 
Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, Eric P. Hartman. Salt 
Lake County was represented by Deputy County Attorney Mary Ellen 
Sloan. Counsel for various other defendants, Robert Liljenquist, 
was present but did not argue. 
The court, following argument and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted on all issues on the bases and for the reasons stated in 
its memoranda; and plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied on all issues. 
2. Salt Lake County's May 1984 tax sale was valid and 
title to the property in dispute is quieted in the tax sale 
purchaser or his successors in interest• 
3. The property was subject to taxation by Salt Lake 
County during all times relevant herein. 
4. Plaintiff is entitled to a statutory lien against the 
property for any tax payments made on the property. 
5. The court's ruling resolves all issues between all 
parties herein# or alternatively, the court, finding no just 
reason for delay, directs entry of judgment on the above claims 
and certifies this Order as final for purposes of appeal pursuant 
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED January / "Z 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
1ES S. SAWAYJc 
'Third District Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MARY ELLEN SLOAN ROBERT LILJ 
Deputy County Attorney Attorney at 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on January , 1990, I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Order, U. S. mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Edward Lore, defendant 
440 North 800 East 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Mary Ellen Sloan 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street, IS3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Robert C. Liljenquist 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorney for defendants, Alan Parsons, 
Erin Parsons, Roy Hockin, Lloyd V. McBride, 
David C. Kunz, and Merit Distributing, Inc. 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
WP:Shelledy.Order 
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overhauled or inserted for the first time. Among the 
latter was § 1 (17). See H. Rep. No. 1409, supra, p. 6. 
But § 75 (r) also was left in the Act, and, as already in-
dicated, its existence was not unknown to the revisors. 
Its very presence in the statute after the revision is per-
suasive evidence that § 1 (17) was not intended to govern 
proceedings under § 75. 
We conclude that petitioner's activities must be tested 
by the definition in § 75 (r) rather than by the one in 
§ 1 (17). The judgment is reversed and the cause is 
remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for considera-
tion of other questions in light of our decision. 
Reversed. 
MR. JUSTICE STONE did not participate in the considera-
tion or decision of this case. 
UNITED STATES r. ALABAMA. 
No. 12, original. Argued April 28,1941.—Decided May 2G, 1941. 
1. The law of Alabama fixes October 1st of each year ns the tax day 
as of which real property shall be assessed for the taxes of the 
succeeding tax year, and provides a statutory process whereby, in 
due course, valuations of properties and amounts of tax are de-
termined. Taxes are made liens on the properties taxed, relating 
back to the tax day and continuing until the taxes have !>con paid. 
The lien is effective not only against the owner on the tax day but 
also against sub-sequent purchasers. Held: 
(1) That the tax lien is not objectionable under the Federal Con-
stitution as applied to a purchaser who bought on or after the tax 
day and before the amount of the tax had been fixed by levy and 
assessment. P. 27'.). 
(2) The fact that the purrhacer, in such circumstaw % was the 
United States did not invalidate the lien. P. 2S1. 
(3) Such a lien can not be enforced against the Uniw-d States 
without its consent. P. 2*1. 
2. A proceeding against property in which the United Siat«- ha? an 
interest is a suit against the United States. P. 282. 
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THIS was a suit brought in this Court by the United 
States against the State of Alabama in which the plaintiff 
sought to have removed, as clouds on its title, tax liens 
imposed under the law of the State upon lands purchased 
by the plaintiff. 
The Court decrees that tax sales and certificates of pur-
chase, resulting from proceedings in an Alabama county 
court for enforcement of the liens, shall be set aside, but 
in other respects the bill is dismissed. 
Assistant Attorney General Littell, with whom At-
torney General Jackson and Solicitor General Biddle were 
on the brief, for the United States. 
The lands were acquired before the time when, by 
completion of levy and assessment, the amounts of state 
taxes had been ascertained. They are therefore not sub-
ject to liens for the taxes. 
Two things are requisite for the ascertainment of an 
ad valorem tax: The tax rate must be fixed and the prop-
erty must be valued. On October 1, 1936, only the state 
tax rate was fixed. The lands had not been valued and 
the county and school tax rates had not been fixed. And 
when the three tracts were acquired by the United States, 
the taxes were *till unascertained. If the assessments 
had not been thereafter determined and the additional 
levies made, the taxes would never have been imposed. 
See Bannoti v. Burncs, 30 F. S92? 89S; Portland v. 
Multnomah County, 135 Ore. 469, 473. 
The ascertainment of the taxes after acquisition of the 
land* by the United States, could not impose any lia-
bility upon the lands. The State could -till levy and 
a«es* for the purpose of imposing a personal liability 
on the former owners. But the property of the United 
States is not subject to state taxation. Van Brocklin v. 
Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151. 179-180; Clallam County v. 
United States, 263 U. S. 341. 345: Lee v. Osceola Imp. 
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Dist, 268 U. S. 643, 645; Mullen Benevolent Corp. v. 
United States, 290 U. S. S9, 94-95. 
The Alabama lien statute did not per se make the lands 
liable for taxes. It neither fixes rates of taxation nor 
enumerates subjects of taxation. It does*not impose 
taxes but secures their payment. Unless taxes are im-
posed, § 372 accomplishes nothing. Cf., Heine v. Levee 
Commissioners, 19 Wall. 655, 659. In re Opinions of the 
Justices, 234 Ala. 358. The declaration that the lien 
attaches as of October 1, when the procedure of imposing 
the tax commences, does not do away with the necessity 
of completing that procedure. Nor will it cure any de-
fect of procedure. See Gaston v. Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, 237 Ala. I l l , 112; Lewis v. Burch, 215 Ala. 
20,21; Laney v. Proctor, 236 Ala. 318, 320. 
The statutory declaration of a lien for taxes imposes 
no liability upon property conveyed to the United States 
before, by completion of levy and assessment, the taxes 
have been ascertained. Bannon v. Burnes, 39 F. 892, 
897, 89S; United States v. Pierce County, 193 F. 529, 532-
533; Territory v. Perrvi, 9 Ariz. 316, 320; see, also. 
United States v. City of Buffalo, 54 F. 2d 471, 474; cert, 
den. 2S5 U. S. 550; United States v. Certain Lands in 
City of St. Louis, Mo., 29 F. Supp. 92, 96; 3 Cooley, Tax-
ation (4th ed. 1924), § 1232, n. 13, pp. 2454r-2455; Berg, 
The Status of Taxes Rohtive to Land Acquired by the 
United States, 16 Ore. L. Rev. 340-356; 48 L. R. A. 
(X. S.) 70S-712. See also, New York v. Maclay, 2SS 
U. S. 290, 294. 
Xor does a declaration of lien like that of the Alabama 
statute impose liability upon property when, before as-
certainment of taxes, the power to tax is lost by reason 
of acquisition of the property by a State or one of its 
political subdivisions, State v. Snohomish County. 71 
Wash. 320. 322-326; Portland v. Multnomah County, 135 
Ore. 469, 473; City of Lnurcl v. Wccm*. 100 Miss. 335. 
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340-341, or is lost because the property is disconnected 
from the territory of the taxing power, Gillmor v. Dale, 
27 Utah 372, 377; State ex rel. Hinson v. Nkkerson, 99 
Neb. 517, 520, or because the legislature divests the tax-
ing body of power to tax. Denver v. Research Bureau, 
101 Colo. 140, 144 et acq. See, also, United States v. 
Pierce County, 193 F. 529, 533. 
The probate court was without jurisdiction to decree 
that the lands of the United States be sold to pay the 
taxes. 
Messrs. / . Edward Thornton and iohn W. Lapsley, 
Assistant Attorneys General of Alabama, with whom Mr. 
Thomas S. Law son, Attorney General, was on the brief, 
for the State of Alabama. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
The United States brought this suit to quiet its title 
to land in Macon County, Alabama. The complaint al-
leges that the State of Alabama is asserting liens as at-
taching to the land on October 1, 1936, for state and 
county taxes for the tax year 1937; and further that the 
State claims an interest in the land by reason of tax 
sales and the issue to the State of certificates of pur-
chase. The Government asks a decree declaring the 
liens, tax sales and certificates of purchase to be invalid 
and enjoining the State from asserting its claims. The 
case was heard on bill and answer. 
There are three tracts involved, which were conveyed 
by the owners to the United States on October 1, 1930, 
December 10, 1936, and March 10. 1937, respectively. 
The applicable statute of Alabama: provides that 
''From and after the first day of October «>i each year. 
'Section o72, Act No. 194, General Acts Aialmm.i, }':£. p. .W. fc 
as follows: 
"From and after the first day of October of each yenr, when prop-
erty becomes assessable the State shall have a lien upon each and 
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when property becomes assessable the State shall have 
a lien upon each and every piece or parcel of property 
owned by any taxpayer for the payment of all taxes 
which may be assessed against him . . . which lien shall 
continue until such taxes are paid." The county is to 
have a like lien for taxes assessed by it. These liens 
are made superior to all other liens and may be enforced 
by sale as provided in the Act. 
Under the statute, the process of assessment for the tax 
year 1937 began on October 1,1936. The grantors in the 
above mentioned conveyances, as the respective owners 
on that date, made their returns and in due course the 
tax assessor listed and valued the several tracts.2 His 
every piece or parcel of property owned by any taxpayer for the 
payment of all taxes which may be assessed against him and upon 
each piece and parcel of property real or personal assessed to owner 
unknown which lien shall continue until such taxes are paid, and 
the county shall have a like lien thereon for the payment of the 
taxes which may be assessed by it; and if such property is within 
the limits of a municipal corporation such municipal corporation 
shall have a like hen thereon for the payment of the taxes which 
may be assessed by it These liens shall be superior to all other 
liens and shall exist in the order named and each of .-uch liens may be 
enforced and foreclosed by sale for taxes as proviced in this Act, 
ur as other hens upon property are enforced/' 
The State also cites § SS74 of Article 6, Chapter 314, of the Code 
of Alabama, 1923, which provides: 
•'From and after the first day of October of each y<vr, the state 
shall have a prior lien upon each and every piece or p-trcel of prop-
erty, real or personal, for the payment of any and all taxes which 
may be aj-sessed a?am?t the own<T. or upon such property, during th.it 
year, for the u>e of the state; and the c«»un:y :h:ill h.»ve a like hen 
thereon for the payment of the Taxes wlwh may b«* a-;< -cd r.^iin-t 
such owner, or upon such property, durins; that yeir. for the use 
of the county; and These liens shall exi-t as to all lands bid in by 
the state at tax sales for the annual taxes thereafter a^e.-cd on 
the value of the property so purchased, in the event of the tax title 
failing/' 
•Act No. 194. General Acts Alabama, 10.°,;>, § 1".), p. 27-4. 
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valuations were certified as provided by the statute to 
the county board of review, which by virtue of its au-
thority to fix valuations, made the definitive assessments.3 
It appears that the board of review met on March 8, 
1937, and adjourned on March 20, 1937. It also appears 
that the rate for state taxes had been fixed by the stat-
ute,4 and the rate for county taxes was set on February 
8,1937, under the authority given to the court of county 
commissioners.5 The school district tax was approved 
by the electors of the school district at an election held 
on June 14, 1937. The taxes for the year 1937 became 
payable on October 1, 1937, and became delinquent on 
January 1, 1938.6 Proceedings were then instituted in 
the county court for the sale of the lands, and under its 
decrees the sales took place on June 12, 1939. The 
lands were sold to the State and certificates of purchase 
were issued accordingly. 
First. The Government, invoking the principle that 
lands owned by the United States cannot be taxed by a 
State {Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151), contends 
that the asserted liens are without validity because at 
the time the tracts were acquired by the United States 
the amount of the taxes had not been ascertained, as the 
values had not then been assessed and the rau-s of taxa-
tion had not been fixed. Therefore it is said that the taxes 
had not then been imposed. The argument is that the 
Alabama tax statute docs not "impose taxes'' but "secures 
their payment'' and that unless taxes are imposed the 
statute has no effect. The lien, it is urged, becomes 
"fixed and final" only when the taxe> hav? been ascer-
tained "by completion of levy and a—eminent." 
There is no question however. a& the Government eon-
rede*, that the *tatc statute purports to impose a lien as 
/</.. §§ 50, 72, pp 2S4. 292. 
Vd,§7,p.2G3. 
*/</.,§ 04, p. 2S,v 
-/J., §11, p. 267. 
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of October 1, 1936, for the taxes which by the process of 
assessment were to become payable for the tax year 1937. 
October first is fixed as the tax day, and as of that day 
owners are to make their returns, values are to be fixed 
and the taxes laid. There is no question that the State 
thus undertakes to create an inchoate lien upon the lands 
as of the tax day, a lien which is to be effective for the 
amount of the taxes for the ensuing year as these are 
fixed by the defined statutory method. This lien by the 
state law is made effective not only as against the owners 
on the tax day but also as against subsequent mortgagees 
and purchasers. "It follows the land in the hands of 
the vendee, all persons being chargeable with a knowledge 
of its existence/' Driggers v. Cassaday, 71 Ala. 529, 534. 
See, also, Swann v. State, 77 Ala. 545; State v. Alabama 
Educational Foundation, 231 Ala. 11, 16; 163 So. 527. 
We find nothing in the Federal Constitution which invali-
dates such a statutory scheme. Subsequent lienors and 
purchasers have due notice of the tax liability imposed as 
of the tax day and of the process of assessment, and that 
liability, when its amount is definitely ascertained, relates 
back to the day specified. We recognized the validity 
of such a provision in New York v. Maclay. 2SS U. S. 290, 
292, where we observed that a tax lien created in a similar 
manner under a statute of New York "is effective for 
many purposes though its amount is undetermined. It 
is notice to mortgagees or purchasers, who are held to 
loan or purchase at their own risk if they take their mort-
gages or deeds before the tax has been assessed or paid." 
The precise decision in that case allowing priority to 
the United States under R. S. 3466 for debts duo by an 
insolvent corporation over claims of the Slate for fran-
chise taxes due but not assessed or liquidated until after 
a receivership, in no way detracted from the recognition 
of the effectiveness of the state law creating a lien as 
against mortgagees and purchasers. As the court said, 
UNITED STATES v. ALABAMA. 2S1 
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"Against mortgagees and purchasers a lien perfected aft-
erwards may take effect by relation as of the date of 
the inchoate lien through which mortgagees and pur-
chasers become chargeable with notice/' Id., p. 293. See 
also, Osterberg v. Union Trust Co., 93 U. S. 424, 425, 428; 
People v. Commissioners, 104 U. S. 466, 468. Compare 
Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590, 598. The lien in such 
a case, though inchoate on the day specified, and maturing 
when the extent of liability is ascertained by the statu-
tory process, is similar in that respect, as the court said 
in the Maclay case, to the lien of a transfer tax or duty 
upon the estate of a decedent which is effective although 
the amount is ascertained after death. 
Our present inquiry is whether, assuming the validity 
of the state statute creating a lien as of October 1, 1936, 
as against other subsequent purchasers, it should be 
deemed invalid as against the United States. The ques-
tion is not whether such a lien could be enforced against 
the United States. The fact that the United States had 
taken title and that proceedings could not be taken 
against the United States without its consent would pro-
tect it against such enforcement. But that immunity 
would not be predicated upon the invalidity of the lien. 
If in this instance title had been taken by the United 
States in the summer of 1937 after the amount of the 
taxes had been ascertained and the respective lien* wvre 
eoneededly valid, still proceeding agair*t the Uniied 
State- could not be prosecuted without it< eon-ot. 
The Government is not content with :h:.r mca-mr uf 
protection. The Government hrin:> thi^  -nit in ih»* vi.-w 
that it is entitled to have a marketable title and it .-eeks 
to remove the liens in question a^  clouds upon that title 
which would interfere with the disposition of the lands 
in the future. From that standpoint the Government 
asks a decree declaring the invalidity of the liens and 
enjoining the State from asserting any claim in the land* 
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either adverse to the United States or to its successors in 
title. We think that the United States is not entitled 
to that relief. The United States took the conveyances 
with knowledge of the state law fixing the lien as of Octo-
ber 1st. That law in creating such liens for the taxes 
subsequently assessed in due course and making them 
effective as against subsequent purchasers did hot contra-
vene the Constitution of the United States and we per-
ceive no reason why the United States, albeit protected 
with respect to proceedings against it without its consent, 
should stand, so far as the existence of the liens is con-
cerned, in any different position from that of other pur-
chasers of lands in Alabama who take conveyances on and 
after the specified tax date. It is familiar practice for 
grantees who take title in such circumstances to see that 
provision is made for the payment of taxes and the Gov-
ernment could easily have protected itself in like manner. 
Finding no constitutional infirmity in the state legisla-
tion, we think that the liens should be held valid. 
We make no exception of the tract conveyed to the 
United States on the tax day, October 1.193G, as we think 
the state statute, as contended by the State, is to be 
deemed effective from the moment the tax day began. 
See Beck v. Johnson, 235 Ala. 323. 324: 170 So. 225. 
Second. With respect to the tax ;»ales the case has a 
different aspect. The proceedings in the county court 
for the sale of the lands were taken and the decrees were 
rendered after the United States had boconie the owner 
of the tracts. A proceeding against property in which 
the United States has an interest is a suit against the 
United States. The Sinn, 7 Wall. 1'2, 154. The United 
States was an indispensable party to proceedings for the 
sale of the lands, and in the absence of its consent to the 
prosecution of such proceedings, the county court was 
without jurisdiction and its decrees, the tax sales and the 
certificates of purchase issued to the State were void. 
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. >. 3S2, 3S6. While 
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pleading to the contrary in its answer, the invalidity 
of the tax sales is now conceded by the State. 
The United States is entitled to a decree setting aside 
the tax sales and the certificates of purchase, and in other 
respects the complaint is dismissed. 
It is so ordered. 
CITY OF NEW YORK v. FEIRING, TRUSTEE IN 
BANKRUPTCY. 
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT. 
No. 863. Argued May 7,1941.—Decided May 26, 1941. 
1. The question whether an obligation to a State is a tax entitled to 
priority under § 04 of the Bankruptcy Act is a federal question. 
P. 2S5. 
2. The Bankruptcy Act is of nationwide application and § 04 tbereot 
is not to be construed or varied by th«* particular rharacterization by 
local law of the states demand. P. 2So. 
Provisions of the state law creating the obligation and decisions 
of the state courts interpreting them are resorted to nor to learn 
whether they have denominated the obligation a "tax" but to ascer-
tain whether its incidents are such as to conMitute a tax within 
the meaning of § 64. 
.3. The tax imposed by the New York City Sales Tax Law «? a ux 
on the seller within the meaninc of § 64 of the Bankruptcy ACT, ;:< 
well as on the buyer, since both are made liable for payment m 
hwitum and subject to distraint of their properv lor it.- ollecMon. 
P. -JS7. 
It is not any The le*s a t.»x la:d on the .-ellcr because th.» Ma:ire 
places a like burden in the alternative on ih< pur«-ha-««r m- I,, < HKM-
it aJTor.Js to the selhr facilities of which he «! -i nut .:\..il iia.»-«•.! •«» 
pa.-< the tax on to the buyer. 
118 F.*.M:)J0, reversed. 
CERTIOHAKI. jjost, p. 552. to review tlu* affirmant of an 
order ol tin* i >i<ti irt Court refusing priority of payment, to 
a tax claim asserted by the City of New York under $ 04 
of the Bankruptcy Act. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that, pursuant to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, I mailed copies of the foregoing Brief to the 
following U. S. mail, postage prepaid, June Q , 1990. 
Edward Lore, defendant Mary Ellen Sloan 
440 North 800 East Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
Kaysville, UT 84037 2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200 
Robert C. Liljenquist 
DAY & BARNEY 
Attorney for defendants, Alan Parsons, 
Erin Parsons, Roy Hockin, Lloyd V. McBride, 
David C. Kunz, and Merit Distributing, Inc. 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, UT 84107 
ERIC P. HARTMAN 
